My research engages with contemporary history and philosophy of science, as well as academic philosophy more broadly, yet it adopts a critical stance toward post-World War II “philosophical” practices. Contrary to mainstream assumptions, I believe that it is dubious to presuppose the existence of unique “philosophical” problems (mostly metaphysical and epistemological problems) outside logico-mathematics, science, and humanity. I also maintain that both the analytical and continental traditions in academic philosophy are built on precarious foundations.
Before the late nineteenth century, philosophy was pursued in the classical fashion, with the assumption that it should unify all forms of human knowledge—logico-mathematics, science, and humanity—into coherent systems. Committed to the pursuit of wisdom, classical philosophers from Plato and Aristotle, through Newton and Leibniz, to Schelling and Hegel (perhaps including natural philosophers like Faraday and Maxwell) approached diverse subjects with a unified vision, often articulated through concepts such as “nous”, “reason”, or “God”. However, the great differentiation of the sciences from philosophy dismantled the classical conception of philosophy in two key ways. First, it effectively separated the sciences (and even earlier, mathematics) from philosophy. Second, through its counterpart, namely, what Max Weber termed the “great disenchantment”, it placed in doubt even the more restricted view of philosophy as a humanistic discipline, as evidenced by the emergence of existentialism. If human beings are perceived as completely free in the realm of “what ought to be”, what ultimately is the purpose of philosophical discussions about ethical norms and values?
In the early twentieth century, more explicitly and more profoundly than anyone else, the eminent scientist Max Weber recognized the crisis of philosophy, famously declaring, “of philosophy, I understand nothing”. Identifying as an existentialist, Weber dismissed the viability of practical philosophy. Concerning the relationship between science and philosophy, Weber understood that sciences were historically integrated within philosophy, yet he argued that this integration should not continue into the future. Finally, Weber was skeptical of the then-popular view of philosophy as logical analysis or critique. For Weber, the question arose: how could a scientist trust a philosopher to analyze a discipline in which they might have no actual experience?
I believe that Weber’s criticism of philosophy is largely reasonable and uniquely captures the spirit of the age of post-differentiation. Yet, Weber’s criticisms also illuminate the remaining roles for philosophy, at least from the pragmatic point of view. First, the work of a logical analyst remains valuable, though similar analytical contributions can also be made by specialized scientists. Perhaps to avoid competing with scientists, it is advisable for logical analysts to focus on materials from the history of science, thus engaging in historico-logical or historico-critical analysis. Second, although Weber might be correct that ultimate questions in practical philosophy are unanswerable, it is still valuable for philosophers to engage in serious discussions on ethical, legal, and political norms and values, informed by a solid understanding of the relevant social sciences. However, it should be noted that serious social scientists frequently address issues similar to those in practical philosophy, or at least operate on presupposed answers to relevant questions. This situation has diminished the uniqueness of the role of a practical philosopher, at least institutionally speaking.
Given these two primary tasks of philosophy, it becomes evident that academic philosophy is poorly informed in both its analytical and continental traditions. Although some current academic philosophy projects inadvertently address issues pertinent to these tasks—including logic, history and philosophy of science, applied ethics, legal and political philosophy—analytical philosophy largely engages in creating and addressing questionable “philosophical” problems, mostly in metaphysics and epistemology. Meanwhile, continental philosophy often obstructs serious philosophical engagement with fundamental questions in humanity through its use of obscure terminology, and in a way it resembles classical system philosophy, albeit executed in a much poorer manner. Finally,it is questionable whether contemporary academic philosophy can fully grasp the history of philosophy. Given the definitive separation of the sciences from philosophy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a comprehensive history of philosophy is unattainable without including the history of science. For instance, Newton should be recognized as a philosopher in the classical sense!
While recognizing the validity of Weber’s criticism of philosophy, I propose that in the era of post-differentiation, philosophy’s two remaining roles are the critique of knowledge (through historical-logical investigations) and practical philosophy (based on relevant social sciences). Both tasks should be pursued with a strong interdisciplinary approach, acknowledging that these roles are not exclusively confined to academic philosophers within institutional settings. All my research projects are accordingly designed. I am currently completing two projects, “the transformation of philosophy” and “vitalism”, and beginning a new one on “evolution and Darwinism”. Moving forward, and possibly for the remainder of my career, I plan to further develop three projects: “AI and computation”, “economics and social sciences”, and “practical philosophy”, all of which I will meticulously design over the next five years.
1. The transformation of philosophy: a historico-critical investigation
In this project, I explore the history of philosophy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries through the lens of transformation. I argue that during this period, philosophy faced a significant identity crisis as the sciences diverged from philosophy and developed into independent disciplines. This historic differentiation caused philosophy to lose much of its subject matter, casting doubt on its problems and methods. At that time, two responses to this crisis emerged: firstly, philosophy could transform into a logical analysis or critique, potentially encompassing all human knowledge; secondly, it could evolve into a humanistic discipline, addressing problems in the realm of “ought-to-be”, where science is ultimately inapplicable. I maintain that the first response, rooted in Kant’s work at the end of the eighteenth century and extending through philosopher-scientists like Ernst Mach in the nineteenth, was more explicitly embraced by various philosophical schools of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including logical empiricists, neo-Kantians, pragmatists, British analysts, and Husserlian phenomenologists. I also demonstrate that the second response was present among some of these schools, most notably among pragmatists, and was unexpectedly influenced by existentialists.
I am nearing completion of this project, and my book, Transforming Philosophy in the Early Twentieth Century: A Historico-Critical Investigation, will be published by Routledge on November 15, 2024. This project and the conception of philosophy it clarifies shapes fundamentally my own conception of philosophy. Accordingly, all my current and future philosophical work fundamentally depends on the conception of philosophy adequate to the age of post-differentiation—critique of knowledge and practical philosophy—as also defended in this project. Fortunately, it is still possible to pursue wisdom under the banner of philosophy in this era of post-Differentiation.
2. Vitalism: a historico-logical study
This project aims to critique all relevant knowledge of vitalism, drawing primarily from the history of natural philosophy and the sciences. Overall it has three goals. First, it presents a nuanced history of vitalism, utilizing sources from not only the biological sciences but also the physical and social sciences. It explores the unique relationships between vitalism and various scientific concepts and doctrines, such as evolution, mind, heat, electricity, magnetism, motion, force, field, energy, Maxwell’s demon, and quantum indeterminism. Second, it proposes a cluster of concepts—including physical vitalism and mental vitalism—to better understand a group of phenomena collectively termed “chronic vitalism”. Third, it examines vitalism in relation to the riddle of life, outlining criteria for theoretically resolving this issue.
I am nearing completion of this project. My book, On the Riddle of Life: A Historico-Critical Study of Vitalism, has been published by Springer.
3. Evolution and Darwinism: a historico-critical study
This project critiques all forms of knowledge relevant to evolution and Darwinism, primarily from the history of evolutionary biology, though not exclusively. I am currently drafting a research proposal and plan to complete this project within the next five years.
This project has two dimensions. First, it aims to compile all forms of ultimate norms and values from the history of human civilizations. Second, it seeks to address concrete problems of significant relevance, whether private or public, based on a nuanced understanding of relevant social sciences. For example, I believe that mainland China urgently requires a comprehensive practical philosophy to address its emerging challenges over the next thirty years.
5. Computation: history and logic
This project intends to critique selected aspects of knowledge within theories of computation. I have not yet initiated any research projects in this area and plan to focus on learning more about computation rather than conducting research over the next five years. In the long term, I aim to deepen my understanding of the fascinating field of AI.
6. Economics and relevant social sciences: history and logic
This project aims to critique certain aspects of knowledge within economics and relevant social sciences. I have not yet initiated any research projects in this area and plan to focus on learning more about economics rather than conducting research over the next five years. In the long term, I aim to enhance my understanding of the operations of modern economic and political institutions.