To introduce my research, it might be useful to explain what philosophy is, at least in my eyes.

Before the late nineteenth century, philosophy was pursued in the classical fashion, with the assumption that it should unify all forms of human knowledge—logico-mathematics, science, and humanity—into coherent systems. Committed to the pursuit of wisdom, classical philosophers from Plato and Aristotle, through Newton and Leibniz, to Schelling and Hegel, approached diverse subjects with a unified vision, often articulated through concepts such as “nous”, “reason”, or “God”. However, the great differentiation of the sciences from philosophy in the nineteenth century dismantled the classical conception of philosophy in two key ways. First, it effectively separated the sciences from philosophy. Second, through its counterpart, namely, what Max Weber termed the “great disenchantment”, it placed in doubt even the more restricted view of philosophy as a humanistic discipline, as evidenced by the emergence of existentialism. If human beings are perceived as completely free in the realm of “what ought to be”, what ultimately is the purpose of philosophical discussions about ethical norms and values?

In the early twentieth century, more explicitly and more profoundly than anyone else, the eminent scientist Max Weber recognized the crisis of philosophy, declaring, “of philosophy, I understand nothing”. Identifying as an existentialist, Weber dismissed the viability of practical philosophy. Concerning the relationship between science and philosophy, Weber understood that sciences were historically integrated within philosophy, yet he argued that this integration should not continue into the future. Finally, Weber was skeptical of the then-popular view of philosophy as logical analysis or critique. For Weber, the question arose: how could a scientist trust a philosopher to analyze a discipline in which they might have no actual experience?

I believe that Weber’s criticism of philosophy is largely reasonable and uniquely captures the spirit of the age of post-differentiation. Yet, Weber’s criticisms also illuminate the remaining roles for philosophy, at least from the pragmatic point of view. First, the work of a logical analyst remains valuable, though similar analytical contributions can also be made by specialized scientists. Perhaps to avoid competing with scientists, it is advisable for logical analysts to focus on materials from the history of science, thus engaging in historico-logical or historico-critical analysis. Second, although Weber might be correct that ultimate questions in practical philosophy are unanswerable, it is still valuable for philosophers to engage in serious discussions on ethical, legal, and political norms and values, informed by a solid understanding of the relevant social sciences. However, it should be noted that serious social scientists frequently address issues similar to those in practical philosophy, or at least operate on presupposed answers to relevant questions. This situation has diminished the uniqueness of the role of a practical philosopher, at least institutionally speaking.

Given these two primary tasks of philosophy, it becomes evident that academic philosophy is poorly informed in both its analytical and continental traditions. Although some current academic philosophy projects inadvertently address issues pertinent to these tasks—including logic, history and philosophy of science, applied ethics, legal and political philosophy—analytical philosophy largely engages in creating and addressing questionable “philosophical” problems, mostly in metaphysics and epistemology. Meanwhile, continental philosophy often obstructs serious philosophical engagement with fundamental questions in humanity through its use of obscure terminology, and in a way it resembles classical system philosophy, albeit executed in a much poorer manner. Finally,it is questionable whether contemporary academic philosophy can fully grasp the history of philosophy. Given the definitive separation of the sciences from philosophy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a comprehensive history of philosophy is unattainable without including the history of science. For instance, Newton should be recognized as a philosopher in the classical sense!

While recognizing the validity of Weber’s criticism of philosophy, I propose that in the era of post-differentiation, philosophy’s two remaining roles are the critique of knowledge (through historical-logical investigations) and practical philosophy (based on relevant sciences). Both tasks should be pursued with a strong interdisciplinary approach, acknowledging that these roles are not exclusively confined to academic philosophers within institutional settings. Hence, my philosophical heroes who could effectively address the Weberian challenge, and did live philosophical lives by addressing it in the twentieth century, are Ernest Nagel and his friend Sidney Hook. With Nagel stand a group of logical analysts, including those from logical empirists, neo-Kantians, Husserlian phenomenologists, British analysts, French historical epistemologists, and American pragmatists. With Hook we have a number of practical philosophers who aim to articulate new conceptions of human excellence, which both rely on and move beyond scientific knowledge.

All my research projects are (and will be) accordingly designed. I am currently completing two projects, one on vitalism, the other on the transformation of philosophy in the late nineteenth and late twentieth centuries. From 2026, I am starting a new research project on biological evolution. Moving forward, and possibly for the remainder of my career, I plan to expand my research to including three subfields: Chinese philosophy (with a focus on the late Ming and late Qing periods), formal theories of computation (with an emphasis on the fashionable AI), and history and logic of economic thoughts (on macroeconomic policies). I will meticulously design research projects on these subfields over the next five years.

Details about two current projects and a forthcoming third one are below: